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Abstract  The authors analyzed the factors that can influence cooperativeness. 
Altogether 102 participants were asked to play the Prisoner’s Dilemma game as a 
measurement of cooperativeness (those people who did not confess were considered 
cooperative). The participants were asked about their sex, age, education, and 
occupation. The results were analyzed using a Chi-square test. Probably due to the 
relatively small sample size, none of the investigated factors affected the participants’ 
answer. However, for education and occupation clear tendencies were found showing 
that higher education and intellectual activity coincided with a higher tendency 
toward cooperation. 
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Introduction 
Cooperative and competitive (uncooperative) behaviour forms (strategies) can be 
found in all areas of everyday life. Some examples are given by Mérő (1996), from 
among which the story of Tosca (An Opera by Puccini) will probably raise the highest 
interest. In the story both protagonists (Scarpia and Tosca) try to cheat the other, but, 
as a consequence, neither gains any advantage (neither of them followed a 
cooperative strategy). The listed examples (Mérő, 1996) show that in most situations 
one can follow either a cooperative or a competitive strategy and the success or 
failure of the adapted behaviour (strategy) mainly depends on that of the other 
participant(s) in the situation. This phenomenon is one of the key problems of game 
theory - a relatively new disciple developed by von Neumann (1928); von Neumann 
and Morgenstern (1944) – named the “Prisoner’s Dilemma” (Tucker, 1950).  
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 The dilemma is this: Two men are found near the scene of a bank robbery. Both 
men are found to be carrying concealed weapons and are taken into custody. Each 
man is interrogated separately and, because of a lack of evidence, the investigating 
officer offers to cut each man a deal. The officer to the first man: "If you confess to 
the robbery then we'll cut you a deal. Implicate your partner in the robbery and we'll 
let you go free, dropping the firearms charges we have against you." The man 
responds: "What will happen to my partner if I do?" The officer: "He'll be prosecuted 
to the full extent of the law. We'll have him up for the robbery and on firearms 
charges. But you will go free." The man responds: "And if my partner confesses too?" 
The officer: "Then you'll both be prosecuted but since you've both cooperated we'll 
only push for a lenient penalty" A similar conversation is carried out with the second 
man. Both men have a choice, to confess or stay silent. They are kept in isolation and 
can't discuss what they might do. We are to assume that both men will act rationally 
to get the mildest sentence for themselves. Firearms charges receive one year, bank 
robbery receives ten years, while the reduced charges will result in five years 
imprisonment. The outcomes can be summarized in table 1. 
 
Table 1. The possible outcomes of the prisoners’ dilemma: 
 1st Man Confesses 1st Man Stays Silent 
2nd Man Confesses 1st gets 5 years, 2nd get 5 
years 
1st gets 10 years, 2nd 
goes free 
2nd Man Stays Silent 1st goes free, 2nd gets 10 
years 
1st gets 1 year, 2nd gets 
1 year 
 
 As argued by Mérő (1996), logic requires each robber to confess, because if the 
other man stays silent then confession results in 0 years in prison (freedom) compared 
to 1 year. If the other man confesses then again it is better to confess and receive a 5 
year sentence compared to a 10 year one. Yet if both men follow the same logic they 
both get 5 years instead of the 1 that they would have gotten had they both stayed 
silent. The question is whether this logic excludes meaningful cooperation between 
these men? 
 In past studies, numerous experiments have been carried out studying the 
prisoners’ dilemma and varying the possible outcomes. In the present study, our 
objective was to analyze the possible environmental factors that could influence the 
chosen strategy in this dilemma. 
Material and Methods 
The study was carried out in April 2010. 102 people were asked to play the prisoners’ 
dilemma following the outcomes provided in table 1. Besides, they were also asked 
about their sex (63 female, 39 male), age (42 14–18 y; 20 19–30 y; 24 31–40 y; 8 41–
50 y; 3 51–60 y; 1 61–70y; 4 71–80y), education (47 primary school, 2 industrial 
school, 17 secondary school, 36 university), occupation (35 white-collar workers, 10 
manual workers, 57 students). Because of the low number of observations, age classes 
over 40 years (15.7% of all cases) were pooled. For the same reason, the 2 
participants finishing industrial school were merged with those of secondary school. 
The answers of the participants (0 = do not confess, 1 = confess) were analyzed by 
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Chi-square test using the Proc Freq procedure of SAS (SAS Institute Inc., 2002–
2003). The participants were randomly sorted into pairs, but, because of the low 
sample size, the outcome (penalty) was only analyzed by descriptive statistics. 
Results and discussion 
The frequency distribution of the answers according to the sex, age, education and 
occupation of the participants is provided in tables 2-5. Altogether 44 out of 102 
participants decided to confess; that is 43.1%. This percentage was 38.4% and 46% 
for males and females, respectively, and the difference between them was not 
significant (p=0.45) (table 2). The average age of the participants was not known 
precisely, but it could be estimated using the midpoint of the different age classes. 
According to this method, the average age of the participants was 28.5 years. In terms 
of the different age groups, the percentage of those participants who decided to 
confess was 42.8%, 40%, 45.8% and 56,2%, respectively, which was not significantly 
different (p=0.98). According to Mérő (1996) females tended to confess in a higher 
proportion (65%) than males (40%) especially when the penalty was increased for the 
participant who remained silent. 
Table 2. Outcomes of the prisoners’ dilemma according to sex 
 Male Female 
Not confess 24 34 
Confess 15 29 
 
Table 3. Outcomes of the prisoners’ dilemma according to age 
 14-18 y 19-30 y 31-40 y 41- y 
Not confess 24 12 13 9 
Confess 18 8 11 7 
 
 Education also did not influence the willingness to confess (p=0.16) although its 
frequency was substantially lower (30%) among those who finished University than 
among those who stopped education after primary school (51%) or secondary (or 
industrial) school (47.3%) (table 4). This result shows that higher education tends to 
increase cooperation, although this result was not proven statistically. 
 
Table 4. Outcomes of the prisoners’ dilemma according to education 
 Primary school Secondary school University 
Not confess 23 10 25 
Confess 24 9 11 
 
Table 5. Outcomes of the prisoners’ dilemma according to occupation 
 White-collar 
worker 
Manual worker Student 
Not confess 24 3 31 
Confess 11 7 26 
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 The results for occupation were very similar to those from education. This factor 
did not affect the proportion of those who showed cooperation (not confess). White 
collar workers confessed in a much lower percentage (31.4%) than manual workers 
(70%). This finding corroborates previous findings: those people whose work requires 
physical activity are less prone to collaboration. Despite the substantial difference, 
this could not be proven statistically due to the low frequency of (9.8%) of manual 
workers. That similar tendencies were found between the education and occupation is 
insignificant, because those who finished higher education were recorded as white-
collar workers almost entirely (94%). 
 When the participants were randomly paired it was found that 17 pairs were 
cooperative (neither of them confessed), 10 pairs were competitive (both of them 
confessed) and 12 pairs were mixed (one of them confessed the other remained 
silent). Thus the average penalty was 3.67 which is closer to the possible maximum of 
5 years (if everybody confessed) than to the possible minimum (if every participant 
kept silent). From the 44 participant who confessed (played for freedom) 54.5% were 
released and 45.5% jailed for 5 years. Almost the same percentages were recorded for 
those who did not confess (played for a 1 year penalty) 58.6% got 1 year while 41.4% 
got 10 years. Thus, those who confessed were jailed on average for 2.72 years, which 
was much shorter than the average sentence of those who did not confess: 4.72 years. 
 Mérő (1996) noted that generally, when the Prisoner’s Dilemma game is played 
only once, the percentage of those who cooperate (not confess) is about 40%, which is 
substantially lower than in our experiment (56.8%). However, when the play is 
repeated many times the willingness to cooperate increases to about 60%. Repeated 
Prisoner’s Dilemma games were investigated by Axelrod (1980 a,b), who organized a 
Prisoner’s Dilemma competition where participants could compete with softwares 
developed for playing the dilemma many times. The participating programs were 
randomly sorted into pairs and the pairs had to play the game 200 times. The software 
that won both competitions was called “Tit for Tat” which was extremely simple: in 
step 1 it cooperates (not confess) and in all subsequent steps it plays the step that was 
played by the opponent in the previous round. The main characteristics of this 
program are friendliness and forgiveness. These features can be considered important 
in order to be successful in situations that manifest the prisoners’ dilemma. In an 
experiment Milinski (1987) analyzed the behaviour of stickleback fishes and found 
that they closely followed the “Tit for” Tat strategy. Unfortunately, many times we 
find that, in Prisoner’s Dilemma-type situations, animals show more rational 
behaviour than humans. 
Conclusions 
In the present study, no investigated factors influenced the percentage of the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma results (confess vs. not confess), which was probably due to the 
relatively small sample size. Nevertheless, we received clear indications that higher 
education and intellectual activity increase subjects' willingness to cooperate.  
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